bargain, as well as your ability to include or exclude, or to be included or excluded. Because power is at stake, making networks civically oriented is thus critical to the mission-sometimes networks foster problems rather than solutions. Creating these networks means a lot more than holding meetings. It means generating sustainable, positive relationships within and across borders. It means trust, rule following, and repetition.
Slaughter's view is that a networked world is "the best hope of humankind for addressing planetary problems that now touch us all" (p. 228). I do not doubt it. But the book raises some challenging questions about how feasible this admirable vision of the world is on a grand scale. The call is for open society, open government, and an open international system, one in which existing international institutions become hubs for citizens as well as states and policymakers proactively generate and nurture the right kinds of connections to help them down the road. That requires states to flatten out the very institutionalized hierarchies they have jealously crafted and guarded. For many, that seems an improbable feat. It also requires a tremendous amount of time, effort, and resources (all scarce) by many actors-generating trusting personal connections is no easy task. And there are potential risks associated, including the cacophony that can come with too many voices at the table. Still, the book weaves a powerful vision for a better world, provides a toolkit for actual practitioners, and shines a ray of hope for a more nuanced theory of international relations. The first two chapters of Return to Cold War attempt to answer the question of whether the post-2014 competition between the United States and Russia is in fact a return to the Cold War. Legvold identifies a series of characteristics that, in his mind, defined the Cold War-which he uses as a kind of checklist to develop something like a general theory of cold wars,
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